Th e article analyzes the discourse of politics of language in Eritrea. It argues that the language debate in Eritrea over equality of languages and bilingual offi cial language policy is more about power relations than about language per se. It relates to politics of identity that derive from the construction of two identity formations as understood by political elites. Equality of languages is based on ethnic identity, whereas offi cial language is based on the construction of supra-ethnic civic identity. According to the constructivist bilingual offi cial language Arabic and Tigrinya are supposed to represent two diff erent socio-cultural identity formations, notably, Islamic-Arabic and Christian-Tigrinya. Consequently, the offi cial language policy debate could be construed to derive from politics of power relation where two groups of elites supposedly representing the two identity formations are engaged in power competition refl ecting real or imaginary socio-cultural cleavage of respective identity. In this sense the bilingual offi cial language is designed to create social equilibrium wherein it is supposed that power would equitably be distributed between two rival elite groups.
Introduction
Arguably language furnishes the necessary underlying ingredient for the politics of identity. Language is considered to represent a key marker of identity. Identity in turn, in a polyethnic setting, constitutes the ground for language groups to make demands for the right of recognition. After all, recognition presupposes diff erence (Taylor 1994) . When ethno-linguistic groups featuring substantial diff erences share common space and at the same time their relation is characterized by marked inequality there arise the need for politics of group rights and recognition. Th e politics of language could be described therefore as the area of study where the interrelationship between language, politics, and public life come together. As such, recently, the politics of language has gained an increasingly powerful position in the dynamics of state politics. As Kymlicka (1995: 111) notes, "languages rights are a fundamental cause of political confl ict, even violence, throughout the world, including Canada, Belgium, Spain, Srilanka, the Baltic's, Bulgaria, Turkey and many other countries".
Since its inception as a colonial territory the issue of bilingualism has been a crucial preoccupation of socio-cultural life in Eritrea. Th e debate revolving around bilingual offi cial language policy gripped the public realm following the demise of Italian colonial rule. Th e British Military Authority (BMA) that succeeded the Italians, probably induced by their political reading of the social fabric of the Eritrean society embarked on in earnest to cultivate a binary socio-linguistic society (cf. Trevaskis 1960; Longrigg 1945 ) based on IslamArabic and Christian-Tigrinya identity formations (Young 2008 : 5, Hailemariam et al. 1999 .
Partly, probably derived from its perception of the imperatives of the constitutive role of offi cial language in the function of state formation, the UN-sponsored federation that went into operation in 1952, made all the eff orts to make sure that the federal constitution of the autonomous state of Eritrea entails binding bilingual offi cial language close (Bereketeab 2007) . Th is, though, a source of pride and joy, engendered bitter diff erence between Eritrean elites (Tesfai 2005) . Releasing its enduring implication for Eritrean identity, the imperial Ethiopian state responded by prohibiting Eritrean languages from public realms (Gebre-Medhin 1989 , Habte Selassie 1989 , Iyob 1995 , Bereketeab 2007 . It was only in the public space created by the national liberation movement that Eritrean languages could again resume having functions of public status.
Th e NLM created an alternative public space for Eritrean languages (Hailemariam 1999: 487) . But, the two Fronts, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) pursued diverging language policy. While the ELF adopted a bilingual offi cial language policy (ELF 1971) ; the EPLF pursued equality of language policy (Negash 1999 , Gottesman 1998 , Hailemariam et al. 1999 . Th is diff erence was interpreted by many observers as infl uenced by the dominant socio-cultural political actors leading the Fronts. It was perceived that while the dominant force in the ELF was of Arabic-Islamic socio-cultural background; the dominant force in the EPLF was of Tigrinya-Christian socio-cultural backdrop. What is interesting here was that even those of diff erent socio-cultural origin internalized the offi cial language policy of the organization they joined.
Th e post-independence government of Eritrea introduced mother tongues as mediums of instruction at lower levels of education, while declaring all languages equal (Negash 1999 , Gottesman 1998 , Constitution 1997 . Th e non-offi cial language policy of the government led to acrimonious debate during the drafting of the constitution (Hailemariam et al. 1999: 488) while small ethno-linguistic groups like the Kunama and Blin appreciated mother tongue education and consequently equality of languages, others were highly critical of the policy. Opponents of mother tongue education and non-offi cial language policy wish to see Tigrinya and Arabic promoted to offi cial status. Th is opposition comes primarily from Moslem communities. At bottom line the contestation concerns that the Moslem elites would like to engender equilibrium between two socio-cultural formations.
Th e objective of this paper is to analyze the debate revolving around language in Eritrea. It analyzes the current controversy surrounding offi cial language and mother tongue policy in Eritrea. My point of departure is that the underpinning sociological factor for the division could be related to power relations. As such, theoretically, it could be explained through drawing on Bourdieu's thesis of language as symbolic power. To that end the paper endeavours to examine and analyze the connection between language, social and political identity and the associated power (both social and political) that each group attaches to its language and what is considered the rival language, and the social role elite rivalry plays in the controversy. It tries to address questions such as: is equality of languages (mother tongue) antithetical to offi cial language? Is mother tongue necessary and suffi cient for ethnic identity formation? How is mother tongue related to basic human and democratic rights? How important is offi cial language for nation-state building process? What are the merits and demerits of tying state language policy to a bilingual offi cial language policy?
Language and Symbolic Power: Th eoretical Framework
Th is section sets the theoretical frame informing the analyses of the debate on the politics of language in Eritrea. It navigates through the notion of language as symbolic power in order to analyze the problematic of languages in Eritrea. Th e French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, in his sociology of language, analyzes the relation between language and power. He expounds that language as a cultural symbol and as a communicational instrument plays a signifi cant political power role. In his seminal work Language and Symbolic Power (1991) , Bourdieu maintains that language is not merely a tool of communication but also a medium of power. In his sociological analyses of language, Bourdieu identifi es the concepts of habitus and fi eld as central underpinning functional tools. He explains the sociological inter-subjective interaction persuasively and eloquently. "Th e habitus is a set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways. Th e dispositions generate practices, perceptions and attitudes which are 'regular' without being consciously co-ordinated or governed by any 'rule'" (Bourdieu 1991: 12) . Dispositions are arguably nurtured through systematic socialization and internalization mechanisms in which childhood phases constitute the start point in the formation and crystallization of dispositions. Further the dispositions are, along the process, structured where they refl ect the social conditions in which they were constructed. Structured dispositions are durable, generative and transposable, according to the theory developed by Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1991: 13) .
Th e second concept, fi eld or market alludes to a specifi c structured space wherein people interact in which individuals or groups are pitched in social games ". . . to maintain or alter the distribution of the forms of capital specifi c to it" (Bourdieu 1991: 14) . One of the conceivably salient properties of a fi eld is its easily convertibility from one type of capital to another (e.g. cultural capital-education-to economic one-lucrative job). Translated into empirical social relation this convertibility of the fi eld could be assessed diff erently than the ethno-linguistic group's social fi eld; if not grounded on a level-fi eld it not only necessarily leads to inequality and disadvantages, but also may lead to social relation whose characterizing feature becomes bitter rivalry and confl ict. It is presumed that the rivalry and confl ict is driven by the need of converting one's fi eld into normatively coveted capital. Capital in all its forms constitutes social power.
Bourdieu further talks about legitimate language. Legitimate language is, according to Bourdieu, the dominant language that assumes offi cial status through asserting its legitimate competence in the linguistic market. He maintains that "linguistic market creates the condition for an objective competition in and through which the legitimate competence can function as a linguistic capital, producing a profi t of distinction on the occasion of each social exchange" (Bourdieu 1991: 55) . Legitimate language, in turn, produces individuals that possess legitimate language competence, that is, competence to adequately use and competently converse in the offi cial language. Acquiring legitimate competence in the conversation with the offi cial language confers upon one a capital, a capital that optimizes the standing of the individual in the commonly shared and coveted market. Bourdieu seems to try to tell us that it is the uneven distribution of the legitimate competence of the legitimate language that spawn discrepancy in capital and power relation among social actors and groups.
For Bourdieu capital consists of three types: (i) economic (material wealthmoney, stocks and shares, property, etc.), (ii) cultural (knowledge, skill and other cultural acquisitions), and (iii) symbolic (accumulated prestige or honour) (Bourdieu 1991: 14) . Th e lesson we can draw from Bourdieu's sociology of language is that the discrepancy in acquisition of the variety forms of capital enables certain groups or actors to dictate their wishes upon others. Th ose who possess the legitimate language competence, it is argued, also possess the ability to impose it as the only legitimate one in the formal market (Bourdieu 1991: 56) . Bourdieu continues: "Legitimate competence is the statutorily recognized capacity of an authorized person -an 'authority'" (Bourdieu 1991: 69-70) . Th e authority confers upon the person both legitimate legal standing in the public realm as well as increasing its competitive advantage. Th ose who lack legitimate legal standing certainly aspire to get it. In Bourdieu's argument, two discernible aspects come out clearly. One aspect deals with the production and reproduction of legitimate language in the market where relations are determined by acquiring legitimate language competence that in turn determine the emergence of a class of victors and losers, at least initially. Th e second aspect deals with the consequent market produced victors and losers, where their relation is decisively expressed in their power relation, that is, while the victors enhance their political power capital, the losers are relegated to a lower status, or are compelled to assimilate in a condition set out by market victors. Understood and interpreted in this way the politics of language is easily converted into politics of power. In this sense Bourdieu's 'Language and Symbolic Power' lies the foundation for why and how the politics of language is converted into politics of power, and the fi eld of language constitutes a fi eld of political contestation, particularly among the various politico-cultural groups within a society. Th e fi eld or market in a polyethnic sociological setting is understood as a cultural-political space where diff erent ethno-linguistic groups enter into trade exchange in an institutionalized manner with the aim of usurping economic, cultural and symbolic capitals that are easily convertible into political capital. Bourdieu's sociology of language has inspired many scholars in the western World as well as in developing societies. Scholarship on developing societies made concerted eff orts to translate Bourdieu's sociology of language into language relation of the polyglotic developing societies. Referring to Bourdieu's understanding of language Goke-Pariola maintains that such understanding leads to the perception that linguistic signs can be ". . . 'signs of wealth' (or poverty), and 'signs of authority' (or the lack thereof ), 'intended to be believed or obeyed ' '' (Goke-Pariola 1993: 222) . Further, Goke-Pariola (1993: 223) notes language is perceived 'in the acquisition and maintenance of power, as something capable of bestowing upon, or denying to the user and great deal of symbolic profi t, and by virtue of this, eff ecting the construction of the social reality of a society'. Th erefore, language is seen beyond being merely a vehicle of communication, as indeed a cultural package. A package through which in addition to acquisition of skills of language use, one learns to accept values (Prah 2001: 7) and social position. Language for all intents and purposes can serve, in the socio-political power game, in retaining profi tability in the market of linguistic capital. All this is contingent on social reality whose defi ning feature may vary considerably.
Quite often, of course, the social reality is conveniently constructed so that it would duly fi t in the intellectually or elite mapped power relation. Nevertheless, arguably, intellectuals try to sell it out in the name of the masses. Bourdieu (1991: 57) , referring to this phenomenon, argues, 'Th e defenders of Latin or, in other context, of French or Arabic, often talk as if the language they favour could have some value outside the market, by intrinsic virtues such as its 'logical' qualities; but, in practice, they are defending the market'. Th e market here represents a space or fi eld where actors interact freely for the production and appropriation of strategic resources or capital, in this case linguistic capital where language occupies crucial strategic space. In saying this, Bourdieu expressly displays the inclination toward the instrumentalist perception of language. Th e theory of instrumentalism in the politics of language discernibly tends to stress that contestations refl ect the instrumental value of language serving power and resource acquisition.
In this respect the production of linguistic capital takes place through endowing a suffi cient and strategic dominant space in the fi eld where production and allocation of the preferred language take place. Th is includes the use and organization of language and education. Th e bestowing upon Arabic this strategic dominant space instead of the mother tongue apparently fulfi ls this instrumental functional purpose.
Offi cial language is presumed to be one that within a territorial limit of a political unit imposes itself on the wider population as the only legitimate language of the public sphere. Th e legitimacy may invariably be dictated by demographic, jurisdictional or both factors. Arguably, offi cial language is bound up with the state, both in its historical genesis and its social-structural functions. Evidently, it is in the process of state formation that the conditions for the constitution of a unifi ed linguistic market, dominated by the offi cial language, are created (Bourdieu 1991: 45) . Here Bourdieu is concerned with the sociological dimension of offi cial language rather than with its legalistic and technical aspect.
Offi cial language, in polyethnic and polyglotic social settings, serves as lingua franca, as a means of communication at the public sphere level across ethno-linguistic groups (Anderson 1991, Mazrui and Mazrui 1998) . It could be seen as a political arrangement that facilitates understanding and interaction between the various ethno-linguistic groups in specifi cally defi ned and confi ned political and juridical spheres. In other words it is a language of the polity and jurisdiction. Th erefore, there is a high possibility that it might not have anything to do with ethnic or primordial cultural identity. It might not also be a language spoken by the majority. Th ose states in Africa that use English, French, Spanish, and Portuguese as offi cial language are typical examples (Anderson 1991) . All this indicates that offi cial language could be an instrument of communication, quite often serving the upper echelons of society at the public sphere rather than used by the layman at a grassroots level. It is also quite often a language of institutions in schools and universities in which case it may be assigned an instructive role. In this sense, the evolution of a language to an offi cial status pursues both sociological and jurisdictional processes and mechanisms.
On the other hand, the emergence of an offi cial language could be seen as an arrangement of convenience, rather a result of complex negotiational and dialogical compromises aiming at the elite. In that sense offi cial language represents high culture (cf. Gellner 1983), whereas mother tongue may represent low culture -folkloric tradition. In so far as they stand for high culture and low culture, offi cial language and mother tongue express relation of opposition. It is not unusual that, in the eyes of the elite, mother tongue is seen as a symbol of backwardness, primitiveness and savagery, where elites look at it with contempt, feel ashamed to be heard using it in public (cf. Webb 2002); while offi cial language could represent the opposite. Moreover, mastering the offi cial language means what Bourdieu (1991: 56) calls possessing legitimate competence, and vests upon one knowledge, power and status.
Conversely, mother tongue could be seen as representing a group's value system, norms and identity. Th is is so because, unlike offi cial language (lingua franca), mother tongue serves in the daily life of the common person. People need not go to school to learn it; to know its codes, the most unuttered, still yet, valuable bedrock of a culture that convey subtle meanings and interpretations. It begins to develop at the same time a child begins breastfeeding and learns the fi rst word with the utterance of that word by his mother. Th ey are socialized in it by their parents and their community, and later internalize it in their daily life in a natural way. Moreover, what is socialized and internalized need to be externalized, transcending from the subjective mental sphere to the objective social-psychological sphere. In a nutshell, they express their feeling, thoughts and actions, from the very rudimentary to the most sophisticated ones, through it. As such, therefore, it has a direct bearing to primordial cultural identity. In this sense, language as a system of expressions of one's thoughts and feelings occupy a predominant position in social and human development.
Brief Historical Background of the People and Languages of Eritrea
Eritrea is located in the strategically important region known as the Horn of Africa. To the south it is bordered by Ethiopia, to the southeast it is bordered by Djibouti; to north and northwest shares its borders with the Sudan; and to the east with the Red Sea. Its strategic location has always been a point of attraction to foreign powers. Th erefore, the Ottomans, Egyptians, Italians, British and Ethiopians alternated in occupying the territory. In its present politico-territorial form, Eritrea was created by Italian colonialism in 1890. Following the defeat of Italy in 1941, Eritrea was place under British Administration. By UN resolution, Eritrea was tied with Ethiopia in a federal arrangement that was put into operation in 1952. Th e abrogation of the federation in 1962 by Ethiopia led to annexation of the country, which already was preceded by the launching of armed liberation struggle (Gebre-Medhin 1989 , Iyob 1995 , Bereketeab 2007 . After thirty years of liberation struggle against Ethiopia, Eritrean became independent in 1991. Eritrea's area is 121,320 km 2 . Its population is estimated to be 5.6 1 million (Th e World Factbook 2009). An interrogation into the constellation and genealogical origin of Eritrean society would give a picture of highly confl ated and malleable constitutive pedigree. At a generic level it would be quite possible to identify three distinctively delineated families. Th ese are: Nilo-Saharan, Cushitic 2 (Afro-Asiatic) and Semitic (Hailemariam 1999: 485; Bender 2000, Chapter 3; Hayward 2000: 80) . Eritrea's earliest inhabitants were believed to be the Nilo-Saharan who moved from the sick bush of South-Eastern Sudan. Later came the Cushitic-Badawi/Beja (Bender 2000: 80) from Northern Sudan and settled in the Barka region and northern highland. Last in this train of migration were the Semitic who crossed the Red Sea from Arabia (Trevaskis 1960: 4) . Th e 1 Th ere is no information about the exact size of the population of Eritrea. So far no census has taken place. Any fi gure is an estimation therefore it has to be taken with grain of doubt. Th e size of the population swings between 3.5 and 5.6 millions.
2 While some make distinction between Cushitic and Hamitic others maintain that both describe to one and the same groups. Further, others to indicate the admixture of the two groups use the compound phrase Hamitic-Cushitic (see Bender 2000) .
Semitic were believed to be the most infl uential group because they brought with them a highly advanced civilization. In addition to this there could be mentioned a recent immigration to Eritrea. Th e Rashaida were believed to have crossed the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia in the late 1860s and settled in the coastal area of Sahil and western lowland along the Sudan-Eritrea border (Young 2008 : 1, Tronvoll 1998 .
Further disaggregation of the three language families would provide a demographic confi guration whose constellation would spawn the current nine ethno-linguistic groups occupying Eritrea. Th e Nilo-Saharan constellation consists of Kunama and Nara whose natural habitat is the Gash region; the Cushitic consists of Afar, Saho, Blin and Badawi/Beja (Beni Amir and Hidareb); the Semitic consists of Tigrinya, Tigre and Rashaida (Bereketeab 2007 : 50-1, Hayward 2000 . Th e Afar lives along the southeastern coast of the Red Sea; the Saho share their habitat with Tigrinyans and Tigre, while the Blin live in the Senihit region and the Badawi/Beja occupy the Barka region. Of the two Semitic groups the Tigre lives mainly in the Semhar and Sahil regions, while the Tigrinyans live in the southern plateau. Th e Cushitic tribes in the lowland came under direct control and infl uence of the Axumite Kingdom "as consequence of which the less remote abandoned their harsh Hamitic dialects to the soft Semitic Ge'ez of their Axumite rulers" (Trevaskis 1960: 5) . Appraised from ethnolinguistic dimension the Semitic groups would consist of 80-90 percent of the population (Young 2008 : 5, Hailemariam et al. 1999 .
Nevertheless, it could be illustrated, over history, profound intermingling between the various ethnolinguistic groups has taken place. Th is extensive historical cross-pollination and hybridization of demographic and genealogical pedigree of Eritrean society presents a higher degree of confl ation than often is recognized. To shed light on this point I will take two examples: that of the Tigrinyans and Blin ethno-linguistic groups. According to genealogical mythology the Tigrinyans were thought to descend from two mystic ancestors, Meroni who had three sons, Faluk, Chaluk and Maluk who inhabited the regions of Akkele Guzai, and Hamasen (Tronvoll 1998: 50) . Th e Seraye region was inhabited by a group called Adkeme Miliga who were thought to be descendants of early Agua from Lasta, Ethiopia (Trevaskis 1960 : 11, Nielsen 2002 . Th e Blin ethno-linguistic group comprises two main sections: Bet Tarqe and Bet Tauqe. "Th e Bait Tarqay were Hamites and immigrants from Agua in Ethiopia; the Bait Tauqay were Tigrinya from the plateau. Th e Bait Tarqay brought with them the Hamitic dialect used in Agua, which they subsequently passed on to the Bait Tauqay and which has since developed as a distinctive dialect" (Trevaskis 1960: 15) . Contrary to this fact, however, the commonplace perception is that Blin as a whole were descendents of Agua.
Th is admixture and changes certainly apply to all ethno-linguistic groups which make the Eritrean society highly mixed and sociologically mosaic.
Overall, thus, Eritrea consists of nine mother tongues (languages). According to their demographic ratio, in a descending order, they could be presented as: Tigrinya (50%), Tigre 3 (31.4%), Afar (5%), Saho (5%), Hedareb (2.5%), Blin (2%), Kunama (2%), Nara (1.5%), Rashaida (0.5%) (Negash 1999: 49) . In the contested Eritrean politics, quite often this demography is reduced into a dichotomy of Christian highlanders and Moslem lowlanders. Further, either guided by political expediency or lack of adequate knowledge, the ratio of this dichotomy is also put into contention. Partisan claims, for political expediency, would exaggerate its own size while underestimating the size of "other". Also ill-informed "neutral" observers may also muddy the picture. A few examples are "Th e Christian Abyssinian comprised more than two-third of the Eritrean population" (Trevaskis 1960: 46) . Th e Moslem League, however, had the contrary view that it was the Moslem's that constituted 75 percent of the society (Tesfai 2001: 334) . Th is demographic distribution certainly impinges upon the linguistic and political distribution of power. Th e diff erential power distribution, in turn, may have given risen to the designing of strategies in order to countervail the demographically induced imbalance which at times extends to a level where its end result may have the eff ect of breaking up the Eritrean nation. One of such strategies is assembling the eight ethnolinguistic groups professing Islam into one block and the ethnic Tigrinyans into another in order to create social equilibrium.
Eritrea and Ethiopia are probably the only two countries in post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa that have their own written indigenous languages used at the public sphere. Almost all sub-Saharan Africa use the language of their ex-masters for public sphere purposes (Brock-Utne 2000, Mazrui and Mazrui 1998) . While Eritrea is pursuing all language equal policy, Ethiopia is pursuing a monolingual offi cial language policy under ethnolinguistic federalism.
Let's now examine the evolvement of Eritrean languages in more detail. Th e primary focus will be on Tigrinya and Arabic as it is around them that language controversy revolves. But fi rst on the mother language of Tigrinya -the Ge'ez. Th e oldest language that was in use by the Axumites, which today is used only in the church by the Coptic Church, was Ge'ez. In the Axumite 3 Here Tigre includes all Tigre speakers: those of Semitic origin and Cushitic origin. While Tigre speakers in Semhar, Senihit and Sahil (Habab, Marya, Betjuk, etc.) are of Semitic origin, the Beni Amir are of Cushitic pedigree. It seems that the few studies that exit give contradictory accounts on how the Beni Amir converted to Tigre tongue. Th at is also no unequivocal account of the ratio of the Beni Amir within the Tigre speakers.
Kingdom Ge'ez served as the language of people and the state from the 4th to 11th century. With the decline of the Axumite Kingdom, it was thought that Ge'ez lost its status as a spoken language. Yet writing in Ge'ez continued after the demise of the Axumite Kingdom until the 19th century and was referred as Lisane Sehuf-the language of literature (Negash 1999: 63) . Ge'ez is a Semitic language that was thought to have come to the region with the migrating Sabaean people from South Arabia (Ostler 2005: 92) . It was thought to be a language of one of the tribes (Longrigg 1945: 16 ) also known as Aga'azean (Gebre Medhin 2004: 16) . It is widely thought that Ge'ez played the role that was played by Greek and Latin in Europe in infl uencing local languages and cultures. Tigrinya and Tigre were presumed to have had derived from Ge'ez (Ostler 2005: 92) . Of the two Eritrean languages, Tigre (spoken in the lowland of Eritrea) was presumed to be the fi rst to derive from Ge'ez (Longrigg 1945: 16) followed by Tigrinya and Amharic. According to Edward Ullendorff (1973: 124) , however, Tigrinya derived fi rst followed by Tigre and Amharic. Ullendorff 's inference seems to be based on the fact that Ge'ez was the language of the Axumite Kingdom, the habitat of the Tigrinya speakers, thus, it is logical to presume that the fi rst language to derive from it should be Tigrinya. Literary heritage of Tigrinya could only be traced back to the 1880s (Hailemariam et al. 1999: 485) .
Concerning Arabic language, practically there exist no academic work as to its origin and introduction to Eritrea. A number of possible factors could have been involved in its introduction. Th e most obvious factor was the historical expansion of Islam. As Nicholas Ostler (2005: 96) notes, "Arabic established itself as the language of religion, wherever Islam was accepted, or imposed". Th rough what is known as the hijra al-ula (the fi rst emigration) where followers of the prophet Mohammed landed at the Eritrean coast in AD 615 (Miran 2009: 167) , Islam was brought to Eritrea. Hence, Arabic as the literary of the Holy Book (Koran) was introduced to Eritrea. Further Egyptian imperial expansion, trade, migration and the annual pilgrimage to Mecca might have contributed to the galvanization of Arabic language in Eritrean (Miran 2009 , Hailemariam et al. 1999 . Th e "Islamic Revival" in the late 18th and through 19th century (Miran 2009: 172) also was a contributing factor. Th e expansion of education in the 20th century and subsequent close tie with Sudan and Egypt might have had a strong impact on Eritrean Moslem lowlanders in developing Arabic language. Nevertheless Arabic remained for a long time as a tongue of the aristocracy. It was probably in the early 20th century that students of ordinary origin were able to travel to the Middle East to study that might have boosted Arabic in Eritrea. By the second half of the 20th century, as Negash (1999: 51) notes, "indeed particularly the intelligentsia, have a near-native knowledge of both 'spoken and written' Arabic".
Th e development of Eritrean languages, particularly Tigrinya and to a lesser degree Tigre, got immense upswing in conjunction with emergence of Missionary and colonialism (Hailemariam 1999: 485-6) . Th e signifi cance of Missionary and Missionary schools in boosting Tigrinya and Tigre was that they translated the Bible in both languages (Negash 1999 , Bereketeab 2007 . Tigrinya got further uplift when, in the 1930s, Italian colonial authorities began printing two pages in Eritrean languages in the Italian newspaper Quotidiano Eritrea; they used Tigrinya and Arabic (Negash 1999: 57) . Th e development of Tigre, however, faced hurdles. It entered in competition with Arabic; some Moslem Tigre speakers preferred Arabic.
Th e greatest leap so far, however, came in conjunction with the commencement of the BMA. By 1943 the BMA began training teachers in Arabic and Tigrinya. Arabic text books from Egypt and Sudan were imported, while Tigrinya books were also published (Trevaskis 1960: 33) . Weekly newspapers in Tigrinya and Arabic were also published by the Ministry of Information (Trevaskis 1960: 34) . Beginning in 1946, when political parties were allowed, further advancement of Tigrinya and Arabic was also registered, thanks to the emergence of offi cial party newspapers.
Th e usage of the two languages in the public realm experienced a dramatic uplift during the British Administration and the Federation period due to the proliferation of political parties and the emergence of an autonomous Eritrean state furnished with its own languages. Th e newspapers published by the Eritrean political parties until they were banned by the Ethiopian state also were either bilingual or came out either in Tigrinya or Arabic (Negash 1999: 57) . Hanti Ertra (One Eritrea, 1950 -1952 appeared in Tigrinya, whereas its successor Dehai Ertra (Th e Voice of Eritrea, 1952 Eritrea, -1954 appeared in Tigrinya and Arabic (both belonged to the Independence Bloc). Sout al Rabita al Islamiya (Th e Voice of the Islamic Alliance) appeared in Arabic. Etiopia (Ethiopia, 1947 (Ethiopia, -1962 and Andinet (Unity, 1950 (Unity, -1962 were given in Tigrinya and Arabic, both belonged to the Unionist Party (UP). Zemen (Th e Times, 1953 -1962 that replaced Eritrean Weekly News appeared in both languages. Zemen was published by the Eritrean Government.
Th e use of Tigrinya and Arabic in the public sphere gradually undermined Tigre. Th e debate on offi cial language of the emerging autonomous state of Eritrea was extremely acrimonious. While the Unionists insisted in Tigrinya as the only offi cial language, the Moslem League (ML) insisted on Arabic and Tigrinya. Amidst the heated debate, at one point, while some Unionists sug-gested Amharic instead of Arabic, the ML countered by suggesting only Arabic should be the offi cial language (Tesfai 2005: 168-173) . Th e Unionists opposed Arabic because they considered it as a foreign language and came with a suggestion of Tigrinya and Tigre (Negash 1999 : 60, Tesfai 2005 . Th ey challenged the ML by referring to countries like Pakistan, Iran and Indonesia which are Moslem but did not adopt Arabic as their offi cial language. At the end, however, as the UN drafted Constitution prescribed, Tigrinya and Arabic were taken as offi cial languages of the autonomous Eritrean state. Th e adoption of the Eritrean Government of Tigrinya and Arabic as offi cial languages in 1952, thus undermined Tigre (Ullendorff (1973 : 124, Negash 1999 .
Th e era of the second Chief Executive (Mr. Asfaha Woldemichael) -1955-1962 -witnessed systematic dismantling of the provisions of the federation of which one dealt with the issue of languages. Following the abrogation of the Federation (1952 Federation ( -1962 Eritrean languages were completely banished from the public realm that threw them into the twilight zone of oblivion. To make sure that Eritrean languages, particularly Tigrinya, were sealed off the public sphere and forgotten, many Tigrinya books were burned (Negash 1999 : 10, Hailemariam et al. 1999 . Pursuant to the commencement of the liberation movement in 1961, however, an alternative public realm was to open for the Eritrean languages (Hailemariam 1999: 487) .
Th e alternative space that was provided for the Eritrean languages was less permeated with political contestation and rivalry. Th e reason for this was that the order of priority was reset. Now what mattered was how to achieve sovereignty. Th e issue of offi cial language(s) at a state level was relegated, for the time being, to the sphere of informality. In the fi rst decade of the liberation struggle, for practical purposes and intentions, Arabic was the dominant means of communication within the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). In the second decade, however, the national liberation movement (NLM) witnessed a radical ethno-linguistic and socio-political change of composition of forces that necessitated reconsideration of language policy. Firstly, the NLM experienced massive participation of Christian Tigrinyans (Negash 1999: 51) . Secondly, instead of one, two competing organizations shared the NLM space (Bereketeab 2007: 188-189) . Th ese two developments apparently gave rise to actively and purposively devising language strategies and policies. Th e ELF formulated its language policy in its First National Congress of 1971. In the Congress, the ELF took a decision that in eff ect would harness the development of all languages, though Tigrinya and Arabic were aff orded the status of offi cial language. Th e decision on languages read this way, All national groups of Eritrea have the right to develop their languages in a way which encourages the development of a new revolutionary Eritrean culture ( . . .) Th e two offi cial languages of Eritrea, Arabic and Tigrinya shall be employed in all activities of the ELF (quoted in Negash 1999: 57) Nevertheless, the pledge made in 1971 to encourage the development of all languages was abandoned in the 1975 approved programme, the latter only reconfi rmed the ELF's commitment on the status of Tigrinya and Arabic as offi cial languages of the Organization (Negash 1999: 57) . Th e Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), on the other hand, in addition to pursuing language policy that promoted development of all languages, its emphasis was on Tigrinya and Tigre. Although in practice Tigrinya and Arabic were used in EPLF's publications, media programmes, popular mobilizations, education and cultural activities (Negash 1999: 58) . Th e language policy of the postliberation Eritrean Government does not seem to diff er very much from the EPLF's policy. Th e pre-liberation language policy was entrenched in the ratifi ed Constitution (cf. Constitution 1997).
Our theoretical treatise expounds that the availability of a fi eld endowed with capital to be readily competed and conquered locates language at the centre of political and social struggle. As we have seen in the theory section, the concepts of habitus and fi eld could serve as signifi cant conceptual tools in our endeavour of making sense of the Eritrean discourse of language and identity. Let's begin with the concept of fi eld. Th e fi eld represents a social space providing an ideal opportunity where resources are freely contested, shared, conquered and dominated. A vital element to bear in mind is that the fi eld has to present itself as entailing common resources ready for social actors to initiate contest in the aim of capturing them. Th is indicates that if there is no fi eld there is no resource, thus, no act of contest for actors. Th e fi eld is where resources or capital production and reproduction take place. Th is situation can be illustrated by referring to two historical events that positioned the issue of language at the political centre in Eritrea. Th ese were the emergence of the Federation in 1952 and the achievement of independence of Eritrea in 1991. 4 Th e UNGA (United Nations General Assembly) passed Resolution 390A (V) on 2 December, 1950 to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia. When the implementation of the UN-sponsored federal act of 1952 began, the issue of the offi cial language of the autonomous state of Eritrea proved to be highly contentious. Th e parliament in its deliberation of the proposal spent seven solid days in a heated debate. Th e dispute emerged between two groups of elites leading two political parties, the Unionist Party and the Moslem League. Th e compromise struck at last gave tranquillity for a few years, until the federation was aborted and Eritrea annexed that brought to the forth other much greater issue of stake to Eritreans. Over the history of the liberation struggle the issue of language was not given greater space. It is only with the re-emergence of the Th e two occasions, the UN sponsored Federation that produced the autonomous Eritrean state and the outcome of the thirty-year struggle post-liberation state, engendering the creation of the fi eld produced and reproduced linguistic capital ready to be conquered. Th e state as an embodiment of resources or capital constituted a central legitimate target for the political actors' competition in their endeavour to appropriate a fair share of those resources. Th e issue of offi cial language epitomized the contention because it was perceived as having a functional and instrumental value of a means to an end. When Eritrea was annexed, and thereby the availability of fi eld ceased to exist, the contention on linguistic capital subsided only to emerge with enhanced vigour again with the rise of the fi eld in the form of the independent Eritrean State in 1991. Th is demonstrates that for a linguistic contestation to emerge there has to be a free fi eld ready to be conquered.
A word of caution, I am not here suggesting that it is merely an instrumentalist rationale that underpins the contention. I am aware that value rational of cultural identity also plays a signifi cant undertone of the contention after all, 'Languages relate to values of sentiments and instrumentality' (Mazrui and Mazrui 1998: 126) . It is undoubtedly appealing to identify oneself with a language and a culture of a much wider magnitude and divine cosmological value; the appeal of Arabic may be fulfi lling that quest. Nevertheless, the instrumentalist foundation of the contestation is also revealed vividly in the language and identity discourse in Eritrea. An instrumentalist nature of language controversy is expressed in the following quote, Some ethnic groups, or some communities within some ethnic groups, are saying, "Well, we want to learn in Arabic and not in Tigre or Afar because we spend all our time trading with the Yemenis and the Saudis. We use Afar amongst ourselves, so why do we need to learn Afar anymore?" Well, also for religious reasons: "We want to know Arabic more so that we can study the Koran and so on -but also so we can further ourselves through trade." (Gottesman 1998: 226) .
Th e instrumentality of this preference is revealed in that the Arabic language is needed to serve as a means of communicating in the market space. Even in connection with religion, it is seen as an instrument of learning Koran. No attempt is made by the interviewed to aff ord it an intrinsic value. In the quoted paragraph there is no claim of the sort of "it is our language" or "our identity". Probably this is so that except for a small ethno-linguistic group, the Eritrean state in 1991 that it again resumed signifi cance and became one of the divisive issues in post-liberation Eritrea.
Rashaida, which can rightly claim Arabic as its vernacular language (intrinsic value), the rest refer to its spiritual and communicative signifi cance for them.
Experiences of other societies also provide ample examples of this instrumentalist nature of discourses of languages. In a similar vein, studies done in Nigeria regarding mother tongue and English show that parents prefer English to their own mother tongue as a medium of instruction of their children. Th e same attitude is expressed in Namibia; 'Th ey told me that these parents had expressed the opinion that schools whose medium of instruction is Oshindonga are useless for the future of their children' (Brock-Utne 2000: 201). Brock-Utne (2002: 7) also reports a similar tendency in Tanzania where private primary schools using English as the language of instruction is spreading. Parents whose choice is English argue, 'in a time of globaliszation, English is the language of the global village'. In the Nigerian case this is explained by the parent's belief that since English is the language of the offi ce their children would benefi t if they were educated in that language. Similar views are also expressed in South Africa (cf. Webb 2002: 10) . English is perceived as a good investment for the future of their children as well as themselves, since children are considered as their parents' life insurance. Most signifi cantly, however, it is presumed that equipped with linguistic capital, their competitive capacity, in the market, increases considerably.
Ethnic Identity and Mother Tongue: Politicization of Language
Th is section discusses the correlation between ethnic identity and mother tongue. Moreover, it analyses how the politicization of mother tongue undermines its functional social communicative value. Th e literature on identity shows a close relation between ethnicity and mother tongue or vernacular language. Mother tongue is perceived as one of the markers of ethnicity. Yet some argue that the relation is not a deterministic one, that is, mother tongue does not determine ethnicity. Th ere are many social groups categorized as ethnically diff erential but having cognate speech, such as the Tutsi and Hutu, the Croats and Serbs. Nevertheless, vernacular language, wherever it exists, could constitute one of the indispensable ingredients of the formation of ethnic identity. What all this indicates is that the role of mother tongue (vernacular language) in identity formation is ambiguous, contingent upon the situation. In certain circumstances it can be necessary but not suffi cient, in others necessary and suffi cient, yet in other cases neither necessary nor suffi cient (Anderson 1991 , Herman 2007 . Generally, language is considered as 'a very strong symbol of ethnic identity' (Opeibi 2000: 188) . Reaume (2000: 25) also notes, 'Most people value their language not only instrumentally, as a tool, but also intrinsically, as a cultural inheritance and as marker of identity as a participant in the way of life it represents'. He further adds that language is a repository of the traditions and cultural accomplishment of their community. Th at language is a central feature of identity is also stressed by Stephen May (2001) .
No doubt every community perceives its language to be an indispensable part of its culture. Looking down on its language could be seen as disrespecting and undermining its culture, and could lead to violent confrontations. Th e relation of language to culture could be described as that of part to a whole. In other words language is a composite element incorporated in a cluster that constitutes a larger body. Th e ethnic group's endeavour to preserve its language is intended to protect its culture. Beyond protection it also demands for recognition and equity, which in turn presupposes a shared space where an interplay of exchange, compromise, competition, negation, nihilism, interchange, co-existence, confront one another depending on the strategic, situationality of relations. Here it is possible to state that there is no straightforward measurement that explains the relation between mother tongue and ethnicity or ethnic identity. What is of saliency is that an ethnic group's language is what it deems to be its language, not necessarily a primordial vernacular language (Anderson 1991) . Th is has been clearly demonstrated by the discussion in the previous section.
Generally, it is understood that cultural elements, which include sets of beliefs, patterns of individual and social relationships and networks, and patterns of worldviews are embedded in language. As such, thus, language is perceived as an embodiment of social or ethnic identity that is manifested in and supported by ideological beliefs and movements. As a version of ideology, 'Linguistic nationalism is that version of nationalism which is concerned about the value of its own language, seeks to defend it against other languages, and encourages its use and enrichment' (Mazrui and Mazrui 1998: 5) . Th e absence of such cognitive development is then taken as an indication of the absence or less developed ethnic identity.
Th e discourse of language in Africa can be discerned at three levels noticeably; 'Most sociolinguistic studies on Africa recognize a three-way distinction between 'vernacular' languages that serve as media of intra-ethnic communication and solidarity, vehicular languages of inter-ethnic communication and integration, and offi cial languages of administration and national communication' (Mazrui and Mazrui 1998: 79) . Th e choices made from these three categories will defi nitely indicate the predisposition of a group whether it draws the basis of its identity formation from primordialism, constructivism, and instrumentalism. In reality, however, it is a blend of all or some of these, which defi ne and explain ethnic identity formation.
Unlike the orthodox ethnicist approach's claim, which makes a direct correlation between mother tongue and ethnic identity formation, it is not rare that choices are made according to instrumentalist and constructivist perspectives, as we saw in an earlier section. Th is is expressed in that groups could, entirely on their own free volition, abandon their own mother tongue and subscribe to a supra-ethnic or a transcendent religious language. Here two processes could be observed as taking place. One is a process of constructivism where, particularly, a religious language is adopted as one's own and concomitantly a collective identity is constructed. Th e second is, while recognizing mother tongue, because of instrumental and functional benefi ts that could be reaped; other languages are preferred for use in the public realm. Here again it could be observed that two processes are taking place. Firstly, a political scheme intended to serve the formation of the imagined or actual 'we and they' dichotomy, which by design aims at creating socio-political equilibrium, take place. Th is in turn seeks to ensure political, economic and cultural balance, in Bourdieu's terminology equitable allocation of capital. Secondly, a genuine need to identify oneself with a sacred cosmology, mediated through sacred script, constitutes a motive for a preference, 'Sacred scripture is itself an additional fertilizer for linguistic nationalism' (Mazrui and Mazrui 1998: 6) . Th e identity formation under Arabic-Islamic category in Eritrea is a formation of supra-ethnic religious nationalism (cf. Bereketeab 2000 : 269f, Bereketeab 2002 , partly driven by the ambition to enhance profi tability of capital produced and reproduced in the linguistic market. Here it could be observed that the two dimensions are simultaneously employed. On the one hand, driven by instrumentalist motive, the various ethno-linguistic groups that confess Islam are observed selecting a lingua franca (Arabic) that would ensure their competitive advantage vis-à-vis Tigrinya; while, on the other hand, motivated by primordialist or intrinsic value, because of the sacred cosmological value Arabic have for Moslems, Eritrean Moslems select Arabic. Th e politics of identity as expressed and defi ned in the Islam-Arabic paradigm necessarily suppresses the ambitions of many ethno-linguistic groups subsumed in it, however. Arabic is serving here as a language of an inter-ethnic communicative and integrative means and mechanism. Th is represents a case where mother tongue is neither necessary nor suffi cient for collective identity formation. One way or the other, language is politicized in order to achieve certain political values, capital.
Nevertheless, in Eritrea, there are ethno-linguistic groups seeking to deconstruct the dichotomization strategy. Th ey oppose the tailoring of two straight-jackets that ethno-linguistic groups are forced to fi t themselves into. Th ese ethno-linguistic groups include Afar, Blin, Kunama and Tigrinya. Th e last group's (Tigrinya) case is diff erent from that of the others. As the largest ethnolinguistic group, also as it does not fall in the Islamic-Arabic subsummation, its concern with the dichotomization is of a diff erent nature. It may be that as the intended target of the subsummation, the group's rejection of the dichotomy could be understood as an attempt to escape encirclement by the IslamicArabic bloc.
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Th e objection to the strategy of dichotomy emanates partly from the wish to develop one's mother tongue and partly to eschew subordination. Th ey seek to develop and preserve their languages manifesting what Mazrui and Mazrui (1998) have called 'linguistic nationalism'. Th is deconstruction also rests on both the primordialist and instrumentalist perspectives. From the instrumentalist perspective the groups are displaying a manifest intention of protecting their interest, in Bourdieu's (1991: 57) expression, saving a market where the values of language competence are maintained and equality is ensured. Conversely, from the primordialist perspective, these groups not only want to preserve their prevalent cultural values, norms and belief systems but also, through employing their language in the private sphere as well as in the public sphere seek to ensure the development of that culture.
Culture is the main pillar in any cultural system, and literacy in a given cultural system represents the most important feature in the development of a capacity for a language to work either as a repository of past knowledge or as a basis for the development and integration of new knowledge into the society or cultural system. In all societies, which are able to advance forward scientifi cally and technologically, primacy is vested in the development and use of languages indigenous to the people (Prah 2001: 7) .
Th ose demanding the right to mother tongue education have probably in mind what is quoted above. Here we have a situation where mother tongue assumes both necessary and suffi cient condition for the formation of ethnic 5 Th e construction of dichotomy: Islam-Arabic and Christian-Tigrinya is believed to emanate from Moslem elites intended to create equilibrium between the two sections. Unless the various ethno-linguistic groups confessing Islam are subsumed under Islam-Arabic they would not be able to match the dominant Tigrinya ethno-linguistic group, is the rationale behind it. Th e Tigrinyans, therefore, have to oppose the strategy because its primary aim is to dominate them. Th ere are those who believe that among the reasons many Christian were lured to support the cause of union was the fear that a combination of Eritrean Moslems, Arabs, Sudanese and Eritrea's proximity to the Middle East might subject them to domination. identity. We are witnessing a case where there is a direct correlation between mother tongue and ethnic identity formation.
Th is is a display of two diverging identity formations in connection with ethnic identity and mother tongue in Eritrea. On the one hand, we have a claim on supra-ethnic identity formation that invokes sacred language as a basis for multi-ethnic identity constellation and is grounded on the instrumentalist and constructivist perspective. On the other, we have ethnic identity formation that rests on mother tongue-culture-ethnicity nexus invocating both primordialism and instrumentalism as the basis of identity rights claim.
If language is perceived serving as a means of communication where it is accorded value-neutrality and as only serving the purpose of interaction between groups then there is possibility for narrowing the gap between opposing claims of identity. Th is perception would further be enhanced by the fact that many of the ethno-linguistic groups speak at least two additional languages to their own. Th is could be realized if only language assumes discursive communicative property that is appraised merely by transcending the interlocutors' specifi c values. Yet, the smaller ethno-linguistic groups aim for what Jones (2006: 140) designated as 'reciprocal recognition: everyone should accord recognition to everyone else'.
On the other hand, if it is politicized and assumes intrinsic value, reconciliations and compromises between language rights claims become extremely diffi cult. Th e ethnic and linguistic discourse among Eritreans and especially at an elite level, since the 1940s were marked by either bipolar (ChristianTigrinya and Islamic-Arabic) (cf. Negash 1999 : 60, Tesfai 2005 or multi-polar (ethno-linguistic rivalry) disposition. Th is disposition is driven by political elite rivalry and politicization of language aiming at conquering the state where the state is perceived as a market where the linguistic capital is produced. Th e rivalry fi rst manifested itself in the 1950s between the Moslem League elites, on the one hand, and the Unionist elites on the other. Later, during the liberation struggle, also a variance of language policy was displayed between the ELF and EPLF leaders (cf. Negash 1999 : 56-60, Bereketeab 2004 . Th at prospect seems to have the eff ect of pitching the various elite groups, claiming to represent their respective ethno-linguistic groups (multipolarity), and dichotomy (bipolarity), one against the other.
To sum up, the strife for the ascendency to political power leads to the need for mobilization and organization of resources among which ethnic resources are involved. Language as a symbolic power resource is not only mobilized but also politicized divested of its instrumentalist communicational value, thereby, assuming an essentialist value. In its essentialist, deterministic and defi ning property of ethnic identity, and in its competitive performative political role, language has assumed, in the Eritrean setting, what Bourdieu has called linguistic market where individuals seek to maintain or alter the distribution of the forms of capital refl ecting their specifi c profi tability to them. Th is has led to active construction and reconstruction, and to the politics of rights where some ethnic and religious groups, and even sub-ethnic groups, are making eff orts to elicit reciprocal recognition.
Mother Tongue Education vs. Democratic Rights Argument
Th is section discusses the increasingly growing infl uential argument that postulates educating children in their mother tongue not only is necessary for their development but also is a fundamental aspect of democratic rights. It is often argued by the 'rights orientation' strand, "the language as right 'orientation' considers language as basic human rights, and that every human being has the right to choose a language" (Agbedor 2009: 141) . Th e politics of language in Eritrea is also geared along the democratic rights argument. Th e democratic rights argument, particularly of the child, seems to be pursued, primarily, by the government. Th e credibility of the argument is, however, contestable. Th e Eritrean Government's education policy has its roots in the EPLF's vision of education during the time of the liberation struggle (cf. Gottesman 1998 , Negash 1999 ). Th at vision was incorporated in the ratifi ed Eritrean constitution. Article 4: 3 of the Eritrean constitution states, 'Th e equality of all Eritrean languages is guaranteed'. Unlike rival organizations that focused on offi cial languages -Arabic and Tigrinya -the EPLF from very early advocated the equality of languages and the use of mother tongue as a medium of instruction in education. Th e argument of the right to develop ones mother tongue was intimately connected with democratic rights. Th e current education system, at the basic level, is divided into three levels, namely elementary (1-5), middle (6-7), and secondary (8-11) (MOE 1998). 6 Whereas at the elementary level, the medium of instruction is the mother tongue, at the middle and secondary levels it is English (MOE 1999). While Tigrinya is taught as a subject at the elementary level, Arabic is taught at both elementary and secondary levels. Th e medium of instruction for tertiary education is English. According to the government instruction of children in mother tongue has given a positive outcome in the overall performance of school children. International studies also uphold such assertion.
Yet the introduction of mother tongue as a medium of instruction has generated considerable controversy (Hailemariam 1999 : 488, Bereketeab 2004 . Th e controversy include claims such as teaching mother tongue weakens the position of the Arabic language, and that mother tongue education in nine languages is impractical, since this would mean mobilizing huge material and human resources (Negash 1999 , AbaArre 2001 . Th e concern of communities may focus on the democratic rights of any community to promote and develop its identity and culture in which mother tongue is embedded. As Reaume (2000: 271) argues, 'People fi nd in their mother tongue a marker of identity, an expression of their belonging to a community, a unique and valuable form of human creativity'. As such not only from an instrumental but also from an intrinsic value point of view, they seek its preservation. Yet no uniformity could be claimed, as was discussed earlier; communities may prefer a medium of instruction other than their own mother tongue. Les Gottesman's studies in Eritrea show some communities expressed preference of diff erent medium of instruction than their own mother tongue.
Sometimes instead of using their mother tongue, in some areas they prefer some other language, they prefer Tigrinya, or they prefer Arabic because they think that since these two languages are more widely used in many parts of Eritrea and everybody knows this language so our children could benefi t more from this, and so on (Gottesman 1998: 226) Here, parents are aiming, by choosing a language they perceived is more marketable than their own, at the linguistic market where competitive and profi table legitimate linguistic competence is earned. What becomes appealing is that adopting the language of formality or offi ce in which mastering it may lead to a prestigious and profi table job in the public sphere. If it is another language than one's own then let it be.
Many post-colonial African governments introduced mother tongue instruction, at least, at lower levels. For instance, Uganda, Guinea (between 1968 and 1984) , Botswana, and Somalia shifted after independence to mother tongue instruction. Niger is in the process of introducing a new policy of mother tongue as a medium of instruction in education. After independence Namibia granted ten vernacular languages the status of medium of instruction in functional literacy and in three lower primary grades (Brock-Utne 2000: 192) . Yet so far, the debate on mother tongue education is, overall, to say the least inconclusive. In some countries it has generated heated and divisive debates (cf. Cohen 2006) .
In all the controversy, however, one compelling argument is that mother tongue education is an element of fundamental democratic (or human) rights. Indeed, there are those who see it as a prerequisite for the development of the community (cf. Tesfai 2000, Th iong'o 2000: 17, Brock-Utne 2000, Gottesman 1998). It is perceived, in other words, as a community's basic democratic right to use and develop its own language. Furthermore, those who uphold the democratic rights view refer to international laws and conventions that emphasize people's rights as basic human rights. Th e World Declaration on Education for All (WDEFA), concerning education through mother tongue notes, 'Literacy in the mother tongue strengthens cultural identity and heritage' (WCEFA, 1990: Article 5, quoted in Brock-Utne 2000: 149). But most signifi cantly, the appreciation of mother tongue education is seen in the realm of development, as Echu (1999: 24) citing Chumbow stresses that 'the early use of the mother tongue in education has signifi cant long term benefi ts with respect to maximizing the development of the intellectual potential of the child'. He further argues that mother tongue education should be introduced in the early years of primary education, and offi cial language should be introduced later on (Echu 1999: 25) . One of the advantages of learning in ones mother tongue, it is presumed, is that children use the same language both at home and in school. Th is would certainly not only make education easy but also quicker.
Since it is through the mother languages that infants fi rst acquire social habits, manners, feelings, tastes, skill, and other cultural norms, it is important that their formal schooling starts with those languages of everyday life at home, (SWAPO, 1989 : 6, quoted in Brock-Utne 2000 Th e Eritrean Government's argument is that basic education in the mother tongue is a fundamental democratic right, as well as it is of vital importance in harnessing the development of the child. Th is view may be informed by the liberal democratic theory that perceives protection of languages as inherent right (Laitin 2007: 117) . In my discussion with offi cials of the Ministry of Education (MOE), in April 2000, I found out that opposition of parents to mother tongue instruction is simply shunned away on the ground that it fails to put the child's interest at the centre. Gottesman's (1998: 226f ) interviews with offi cials of the MOE also express similar views.
Th e proponents of the view of basic education in mother tongue uphold that parents' preference for Arabic should be juxtaposed with the rights of the child. Here it is passionately argued that the child's right should be given priority. Th e issue of the child's rights raises, however, a legitimate question of who has the right of taking the decision -the parents or the state. Th e parent versus the state, in relation to the right to decide the child's medium of instruction, is also related to ethnicity versus state. Th e liberalist view would argue that the individual child should be able to choose, not simply follow his parents' choice (Laitin 2007: 122) . Th is concern prompted me to raise a question in our discussion with offi cials in the MOE about what should come fi rstethnic rights or the right of the state to impose educational policies and medium of instruction. Th e answer given was that state policies should be aff orded precedence over parents' wishes. Th e question becomes even more complicated when it is posed in the manner of ethnic versus state. If the protagonist was the isolated individual or parents opposing the state, it would perhaps be easier for the state to overlook the wish of parents. But when the ethnic group as a collectivity substitutes parents, the matter then assumes a complex political dilemma. Th is is so that a majority or stronger ethnic group in power may override the wishes of minority groups and may impose its own language preference.
Moreover, when mother tongue is juxtaposed against democratic rights, the fundamental question that comes to mind is democratic rights of the individual or the collectivity -ethno-linguistic group. Th is brings us to the perennial debate between liberal theory and communitarian theory (cf. Kymlicka 1995) . Kymlicka (1995: 34) , after saying that there is no contradiction between liberalism and collective rights, maintains that individual rights of minority groups could only be achieved within collective rights. We will not now indulge in the philosophical debate whether individual rights or collective rights take precedence, or if they are mutually exclusive or not. What is of interest is that, in Eritrea, both proponents and opponents of mother tongue education seem to take ambivalent position concerning this question. If we take, for instance, the view of the proponents of the mother tongue education the whole argument is built on the development of the ethno-linguistic group. Yet, it does not appear that the ethno-linguistic groups are given the full opportunity to choose, plan, execute and monitor the development of the language of their choice. Quite often the decision comes from above, a topdown strategy, exercised by the government and elites of organizations. What is conspicuously missing is bottom-up strategy where the communities are allowed room to make their own decisions. Perhaps the reluctance to let the ethno-linguistic groups decide for themselves could be explained by the fact that what is desired is not the consolidation of ethnic identity, but national identity. In that sense ethnicity is perceived as transitory phenomenon, an ephemeral stage, until the desired goal is achieved. Hence mother tongue should not be used to enhance ethnicity as cemented identity formation. As Mazrui and Mazrui (1998: 103) note the sociolinguistic consequence of mother tongue education in polyethnic society could be vertical integration at the expense of horizontal integration where ethno-linguistic affi liation and solidarity grows stronger that cross ethnic and geographical integration is impeded. Th is is exactly what nation builders are afraid of.
Neither are opponents of the mother tongue education concerned about the democratic rights of the individual or the ethno-linguistic group when it comes to the language issue. Th eir main concern is the position of the Arabic language in society. Th ey think the introduction of mother tongue education would discriminate Arabic by disintegrating the Moslem communities, since learning mother tongue substitutes Arabic. Th ey accuse the government of dismantling Arabic schools and substituting them with mother tongue schools (cf. AbaArre 2001 , EISM 1998 . Moreover, mother tongue education policy is probably evaluated from the eff ect it would have on the undesired consolidation of ethnic identity, since the aspiration is supra-ethnic pan-Islamic identity (cf. Bereketeab 2002 Bereketeab , 2004 . Paradoxically, both groups seem to be in confl uence in their implicit or explicit opposition to ethnicization.
Offi cial Language Versus Equality of Languages (Mother Tongues)
Th is section focuses on the debate revolving around the policy of adopting offi cial language versus endowing mother tongues equal status. A linguistic community can be defi ned as a group of people who use the same system of linguistic signs (Bourdieu 1991: 45) . Most societies consist of multi-ethnic communities speaking various related or unrelated languages. In the absence of a single major language commanding loyalty and adherence across community boundaries there arises a competitive relation among the languages. Th e need for modern states to centralize and integrate their citizens on one hand, and to distinguish themselves from others, on the other, made it necessary to have some kind of formal language that serves in the public sphere. In this sense offi cial language is endowed a high political and symbolic value connoting sovereignty of the state. Th e choice and process of evolvement of this formal offi cial language pursued a variety of routes (more on this later).
Scholars are divided concerning the status of languages. Some champion the equality of languages, 'Every language, whether spoken by a community of only a hundred or by a community of millions has a right to be and a right to develop a literature and knowledge unhindered by the policies of the State. Th e acceptance of the unqualifi ed equality of all the nationalities within any one country and in Africa as a whole is the prerequisite for any success of a national or even a continental language policy' (Th iongo 'o 2000: 16-17) . Th is is, however, an extreme view of language rights. Nevertheless, in spite of the increasingly growing disposition of using mother tongue as medium of instruction only few governments have or had policies of mother tongue education. Guinea had an offi cial mother tongue education policy from 1968-1984 whereas in Uganda it still is an offi cial policy (Brock-Utne 2000: 166) . Th e juxtaposition of mother tongue and offi cial language in a polyglotic and polyethnic societal setting may take a special fashion of arrangement. In these types of societies rarely does the condition exist where the offi cial language is congruent with mother tongue. In the absence of such congruence their relation assumes a hierarchical order where offi cial language serves the formal and public sphere (national polity), while mother tongue may serve the informal and private sphere (local level) of the polity.
Among Eritreans the debate on offi cial language and mother tongue engenders heated debate and has become a very divisive matter.
7 One of the reasons that make it so emotionally charged and complex is that mother tongue and offi cial language are put in a zero-sum state of relation. One way of easing this tension would then be making functional and structural distinction between mother tongue and offi cial language.
Th e debate on offi cial language versus non-offi cial language in Eritrea refl ects the unresolved and confused nature of relation between offi cial language and mother tongue. Proponents and opponents of either strand of the binary, supported by a variety of validating and legitimating arguments and analyses, passionately argue that endorsing their preference of the binary is in the best interest of the nation. Proponents of offi cial language, for instance, as a support for their argument, invoke that Arabic and Tigrinya served as offi cial languages in the past (cf. Gottesman 1998: 80) , and in that capacity they (the two languages) symbolized and affi rmed Eritrean national unity. Failing to adopt offi cial language policy, its proponents maintain, would certainly lead to division of society. According to their assumption, Arabic and Tigrinya would ensure cohesion of society consisting of two socio-cultural formations. For opponents of bilingual offi cial languages policy, conversely, Tigrinya and 7 Inside the country, public debate took place during the drafting of the constitution. Since the ratifi cation of the constitution, however, debate has been running outside the country within the Eritrean Diaspora. Th e Moslem communities in the Diaspora have been expressing their strong disapproval of the non-offi cial language policy of the Eritrean government. Not only Islamic movements but also secular opposition groups based in the Diaspora (see political programme of these opposition groups) are also advocating for the bi-language offi cial policy. Various Eritrean Diaspora websites host highly emotional and divisive debates related to language issue. A few that could be mentioned include awate.com, asmarino.com, alkhalas.org, alnahda. com, togoruba.org, islaher.org, omaal.org, etc.
Arabic were introduced as offi cial by colonial powers, as colonial project therefore had to be corrected in the post-liberation state arrangement (Negash 1999: 56) .
Proponents of offi cial language argued that equality of languages will create serious practical problems such as providing adequate teaching staff and material for mother tongue schools. It would be economically expensive to provide necessary provisions -translation facilities -in the public sphere in all nine languages (Negash 1999: 54-5) . Th ey also argue that it will lead to isolationism (Ahmed 1996) . Th e issue of expenses, although casting light on the problem of practicability, is very technical. It has to be weighed against the issue of principle that is the communities' rights for their own mother tongues according to an offi cial of the Ministry of Education.
8 Th e politicized nature of the debate is, however, creating an obstacle for a substance-based analyses. So far sensible and sombre discourse of language has proved to be futile. Th ere seems to be a pervasive suspicion that the rationale behind each strand's stand is the urge for socio-cultural and political domination. Th e suspicion further gains currency because the discourse is carried out primarily by opposing political forces who might have their own political agenda. Academic research is markedly absent.
For the Government, the language issue is constitutionally resolved through constitutionally aff ording all languages equality. Th e policy of non-offi cial language is intended to ensure equality of mother tongues (cf. National Charter 1994, Constitution 1997). Opponents of the government, however, charge that the non-offi cial language policy is creating domination of the Tigrinya mother tongue and consequently endangering unity of the nation.
Th e language issue remains a critical one still plaguing many societies. It was not only post-liberation Eritrea that sought to address the issue of language through adopting policy of equality of mother tongues. Th e post-apartheid South African Constitution also made all eleven major languages equal and offi cial (see Brock-Utne 2002: 11) . Nevertheless, in spite of equality of languages, Afrikaans and English are still privileged in South Africa (BrockUtne 2002: 12), as Tigrinya and Arabic are dominant in Eritrea. In practice Arabic, English and Tigrinya are serving as working languages in Eritrea (cf. Handbook 2002 : 36, Hailemariam 1999 . Th is should have assuaged fears of proponents of offi cial language policy. Yet, since in virtue of its demographic preponderance, Tigrinya has gradually assumed undeclared offi cial status, the fear of the proponents of offi cial language policy seem to have been realized and consequently the resentment of non-Tigrinya groups on the Tigrinyans has been greatly reinforced.
Th e acrimonious debate revolving around the relation between mother tongue and offi cial language in Eritrea seems partly to stem from an erroneous zero-sum perception that is supposed to guide the relation. To tackle this problem, we could suggest therefore, above all, the zero-sum perception has to be rejected. Any view that upholds the perception that adopting the one is a guaranteed loss of the other should be rejected outright. Secondly, if at the end a policy of offi cial language is adopted, a distinction needs to be made. As it seems to be the case, if Arabic and Tigrinya are selected as offi cial languages, it should be acknowledged that they preoccupy formal and public sphere position while the rest of the mother tongues may occupy the informal, private or sub-national positions. In this respect there would not be a winner or loserzero-sum -relation because the other ethno-linguistic groups are also given the chance to develop their vernacular tongue.
Th e distinction made between mother tongue and offi cial language might probably contribute to the easing of the polarized debate on the language issue. From the discussion above it might safely be concluded that the fear based on the zero-sum perception that rights for mother tongue would mean loss for the Arabic language and vice versa does not appear to hold ground. Th e project of packaging the various ethno-linguistic groups into a pan-Islamic identity cluster, with the intended aim of creating social equilibrium, probably, also need to be avoided. It is repressive seen against mother tongues, but also creates an artifi cial bipolar -Arabic-Islamic and Tigrinya-Christian -that might have a corrosive eff ect on social cohesion. Because, for sure, it also evokes a feeling of suspicion among Tigrinya speakers about the intention of pan-Islamic agents.
It would be worthwhile to point out that Arabic and Tigrinya are both lingua franca and vernacular languages.
9 Arabic is a vernacular language because it is a mother tongue of the Rashaida ethno-linguistic group. It is also a lingua franca because it is used across the various Moslem ethno-linguistic communities as a medium of communication as well as language of the Holy Book, Koran. Similarly Tigrinya is a vernacular language because it belongs to 9 From technical and instrumentalist perspective are languages described as lingua franca when they are used as means of communication across boundaries of ethno-linguistic groups, while simultaneously they constitute vernacular languages due to their intrinsic value to certain ethno-linguistic group(s). Th is reality however would not diminish the symbolic political meaning and role, particularly when language is politicized, in a polyglotic and polyethnic societal setting.
the Tigrinya ethno-linguistic group, and it is also a lingua franca serving as a means of communication across various ethno-linguistic groups.
Why Bilingual Offi cial Language Policy?
Th is section analyzes the rationale behind bilingual offi cial language policy in Eritrea. It argues that, if offi cial language policy is endorsed, then it could only be bilingual; the reasons for this are also detailed. Th ere are strong arguments for the benefi ts that can be harvested from having a single offi cial language. Th e parsimoniality of having a single offi cial language in terms of economics, politics, social, culture, and technology is often emphasized. (Reaume 2000: 269) notes, 'It is obviously much more convenient and cost-eff ective if everyone in a country speaks the same language'. Opponents of mother tongue in Eritrea also alluded to the cost incurred in having a policy of equality of mother tongues (Negash 1999: 54-5) . Further, what speaks for this perspective is the presumption that monolingualism contributes to national unity. Th e precarious nature of the societal formation of developing societies is often perceived as rendering these societies vulnerable to linguistic division and claims thus lending currency for the choice of mono-linguality.
Th e functionalist school of thought, unlike the formalist one, 'see language as a system of human communication, an instrument of verbal interaction among human beings . . . an instrument by means of which people can enter into communicative relations with one another' (Opeibi 2000: 187) . Moreover, communication is defi ned as 'the ways we transmit our thoughts and feelings to other people either by speaking or by writing and receive other peoples' thoughts and feelings either by listening or reading' (Opeibi 2000: 187) . According to the functionalist approach what matters is that people are communicating rather than whose language is being used.
Nevertheless, communicative needs are not the only reasons governing language preferences. As the formalist school of thought (see Opeibi 2000: 187) demonstrates language is also imparted in its own value. Arguing along this line Reaume (2000) makes distinction between the instrumental and intrinsic value of language. In the intrinsic value perspective, linguistic value is shifted, from a rational calculative to a position of endowing language a reifi ed status, good in itself (Reaume 2000: 246) . Both intrinsic and instrumentalist perceptions of language have implications for the preference of offi cial language, in this case bilingual offi cial language.
Socio-cultural realities that form a congenial base for an ideal situation where monolingualism is the modus vivendi are, however, rarely readily available in post-colonial societies. Th is is particularly true when we pay attention to the fact that African nations are the product of colonial mishmash, that is, encompassing multifaceted polyglotic and polyethnic entities. Th e societal formation of the Eritrean society necessitates addressing the issue of offi cial language in a manner that satisfi es both intrinsic and instrumental values of the various ethno-linguistic groups. In that sense the issue of bilingual offi cial language has occupied a central position in the Eritrean polity since colonial times in the 1940s. It assumed a centre stage when the British authorities and the UN embarked on drafting the constitution of the autonomous Eritrean state. Indeed, it is widely believed that it was the British authorities, deriving from their conviction that Eritrea consists of binary socio-cultural units that formalized the notion of bilingualism (Young 2008 : 17, Bereketeab 2004 . Since then the notion of bilingual offi cial language has characterized the socio-cultural and political discourse in Eritrea.
Th e ideal situation for Eritrea would be a single offi cial language model. Th is would certainly have facilitated the nation state building process. From a utilitarian perspective it is wise and politically motivated to search for a widely used lingua franca. At a certain point of time, prominent Nigerian academics and politicians advocated for the choice of Hausa as a Nigerian lingua franca. It was rejected on the ground of political and cultural implications (Opeibi 2000: 193) . In the case of Eritrea, although, as far as my knowledge goes, there is no statistical data, the estimation is that more than 80 percent of the Eritrean society may be able to communicate through Tigrinya. Th erefore, from a communicative instrumentality and functionality point of view a compelling argument could be done for Tigrinya to be an offi cial language. Th is argument would assume currency when taken into consideration that a language with communicative power of only 35 percent (Ivory Coast), 20 percent (Kenya), 10 percent (Namibia), 30 percent (Nigeria), 5 percent (Tanzania) (Webb 2002: 6) could be the offi cial language.
Yet, politically, it could not be accepted as a sole offi cial language (cf. Negash 1999 , AbaArre 2001 . Th is is because it is associated with an ethno-religious group. Indeed Moslems see it as a language of the Christians representing and refl ecting their values, norms and belief system. In other words it is given an intrinsic value instead of assuming instrumental functional value. Conversely, there is a large group who can communicate through Arabic. Neither could Arabic be accepted as a sole offi cial language, for two reasons. First, it is only a tiny minority group (the Rashaida) who could rightly claim it as its mother tongue. Second, it is associated with a religion -Islam -and might not be acceptable to the Christians. It is widely believed, in socio-linguistic studies, that the successful elevation of a language to the position of lingua franca is contingent on it not being affi liated with a particular ethnic or religious group (see Mazrui and Mazrui 1998: 180) . Such affi liation of a language with an ethnic or religious group makes it less appealing to the other groups to be a lingua franca because they think it would lead to their domination. In addition what makes the language issue in Eritrea very critical is its politicization.
Th is politicization of language was further complicated by the emergence of two rival organisations during the liberation struggle: the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). Broadly speaking, the leadership of the fronts exhibited variance in their language ideologies (Negash 1999: 56-60) . But most crucially, they were perceived as representing binary socio-cultural identity formations. Th e ELF leadership was perceived as, more or less, inclining toward Arabic-Islamic socio-cultural identity, whereas the EPLF leadership was perceived as inclining toward TigrinyaChristian socio-cultural identity. Th is feeling was primarily fostered by many Moslem leaders of the ELF (cf. Amar 1992 : 104, 106, Bereketeab 2004 : 220, Negash 1999 : 56-60, ELF-RC 1989 .
Arabic is also considered by the Christians as embodying Islamic values, norms and belief system. If either language is, then, to have a chance of becoming an offi cial language it has to shed down its intrinsic value and assume instrumental value. Unless they are deconstructed from their intrinsic value, or their functional and instrumental value -as means of communication and interaction -is imparted pre-eminence, separately, they are going to be invariably dysfunctional. Th eir social functionality could only be conceived under the circumstance that they both ascend to offi cialdom. Both languages could only function as offi cial languages by providing an alibi to each other. In this sense there seem to exist a sort of imperative political symbiosis between the two languages. Hence some sort of structural arrangement is required in order for them to be functional in their designated roles as social and symbolic national icons.
In a situation where bilingual offi cial language model reigns, if they are not deconstructed of their intrinsic value, the social consequence could be a development where a bi-nation (two nations) model becomes predominant. Th is is so because as the formalism-intrinsic perception demonstrates by endowing language its own value, and further in a normatively prescribing language to be a fundamental component of culture, and by extension, by imparting culture the chief defi ning as well as determining criterion of an ethnic nation or ethnonationalism, it paves the way, at least in theory, for the creation of two nations; although the call for bilingual offi cial language policy aspires to engender fl uent bilingual Eritreans. Th is scenario resembles the critical ethnolinguistic based ethno-nation formation plaguing countries such as Canada, Belgium, Switzerland described by Will Kymlicka (2006: 57) . Th e sociological down side of the bilingual offi cial language policy and its probable resultant bi-nation formation is the danger it poses in the division and ultimate creation of two sovereign nation states. It is also discriminatory, that is, it discriminates those ethno-linguistic groups that oppose falling in the straightjacket binary. It would relegate the minority groups that do not fall in the binary to subordinate position. Bourdieu (1991: 6) observes, By promoting the offi cial language to the status of the national language-that is, the offi cial language of the emerging nation-state-the policy of linguistic unifi cation would favour those who already possessed the offi cial language as part of this linguistic competence, while those who knew only a local dialect would become part of a political and linguistic unit which their traditional competence was subordinate and devalued.
Further it might also, as some fear, have the eff ect of, 'the fact that the religious/regional cleavages divide the Eritrean society into two equal and unranked groups (Horowitz 1985, 23-26) , which when politiciszed and mobilized could polarize the society into two large warring religious/regional protonational groups and destabilize the very foundation of Eritrean claims to self-determination and independent statehood' (Woldemikael 1993: 197) . Perceived from nation formation perspective, then, a bilingual offi cial language strategy runs the risk of producing two mutually exclusive nations that is worrisome and disruptive to the nation state building agents. It is this phenomenon that is pushing Belgium to the brink of division into French speaking and Dutch speaking (cf. Kymlicka 1995 Kymlicka , 2006 .
In Mazrui and Mazrui's (1998) typology of African languages, Tigrinya would fi t in the Afro-ethnic languages category and Arabic in the Afro-Islamic languages category.
10 Th e African origin (sub-Saharan) of Arabic, in the Eritrean context, however, is quite often put into question. Th e Unionists, for instance, exerted stiff resistance before accepting Arabic as the co-offi cial language in the 1950s for the sake of national unity (cf. Bereketeab 2004 : 222-3, Tesfai 2005 . Th eir argument was that Arabic is an alien language. Since the 1950s, when the UN-sponsored federal arrangement introduced a bilingual offi cial language, competition and functional complimentarity seem to characterize the two languages, at the public sphere, in Eritrea, however.
10 Th e Afro-ethnic category entails all the languages whose speakers are primarily African and which have been shaped minimally, if at all, by Arab-Islamic or Euro-Christian impact. AfroIslamic languages are native to Africa in terms to their speakers. Unlike Afro-ethnic languages, the Afro-Islamic language have been infl uenced heavily by Islam due to the identity of their native speakers over centuries and contact with the Arabic-Islamic world (Mazrui and Mazrui 1998: 70) .
Offi cial Language: Social Integration and Nation State Building
Historically, the emergence of offi cial language and the evolution of the modern state went hand in hand. In Europe, the transition from the absolute monarchic state to the modern liberal capitalist state was accompanied by the struggle to develop an offi cial language. Indeed as Stein Rokkan (1975) observes the emergence of vernacular languages in opposition to the GrecoLatin language advanced the formation of modern nation states. Th is ontological overlap gradually informed the epistemic genre of all subsequent actors of nation state building where replication was taken as necessary measure to ensure potent and functional nation states. Until the French Revolution the thrust of offi cial language was instrumentally connected with construction of monarchical state (Bourdieu 1991: 46 ). Yet environmentally, as a high culture (Gellner 1983) , it was hanging high up at the nobility, upper class level. It was only pursuant to the French Revolution that it was brought down to serve the entire society -upper and lower classes. Th e French Revolution declared that the nation is equal to the sovereign people (Smith 1983: 191) . Th e emerging modern nation state desperately needed a standardized and centralized offi cial language that imposed its dominance over local dialects (Bourdieu 1991: 46-7) . In its endeavour of creating a territorially based national identity, inwardly inclusive and outwardly exclusive, the state imposed a formal offi cial language aiming at homogenizing and centralizing the society within its borders. Th e rationale behind having offi cial language was that it was fi rmly believed it would play a catalystic social function in bringing integration and cohesion of society, decisive ingredient in nation state building (Kymlicka and Patten 2003) .
Th is process led, gradually, to the emergence of overall mono-language nation states. Afterwards the principle became an overriding model. Th ose few that constitute the exceptions like Canada, Belgium and Switzerland found themselves in a state of continuous struggle where centrifugal forces are consistently challenging the central state that made these states to see the monolingual state with an envying eye. In the nationalist discourse it is widely held that 'a common language could help create a sense of national identity' (Anderson 1991 , Hobsbawm 1990 ). Fostering linguistic commonality will be conducive to political stability and a greater willingness of citizens to bear the reciprocal sacrifi ces necessary for the common good' (Reaume 2000: 269) became the predominant perception guiding nation state builders.
In spite of certain similarities, regarding its ontological and epistemological origin, there is a marked diff erence in the historical route of nation state formation in Western Europe and Africa. Th e European model was characterized by societal transformation from heterogeneity of imperial states to homogeneity of unique nation states. Th e African model is often described as a development from homogeneity to heterogeneity. As cogently described by Lewis (1983: 73): It is a remarkable irony that the European powers who partitioned Africa in the late 19th century when the idea of the nation-state was paramount, should have created in Africa a whole series of Habsburg-style states, comprising a medley of peoples and ethnic groups lumped together within frontiers which paid no respect to traditional contours.
Th e ambitions and dreams of post-colonial African leaders have been and are still to achieve homogenous nation states. Th e reality on the ground speaks a diff erent language, however. Th e post-colonial societies of Africa, conscious of the polyethnic and polyglotic nature of their societies opted for the adoption of the language of their colonizers as lingua franca. Awakening African languages is considered as provoking and inciting rivalry and confl ict that could certainly lead to the end of African State, as we know it today. Yet, as the work of Mazrui and Mazrui (1998) shows, the absence of linguistic nationalism adversely aff ects the nation state building process. Indeed, the post-colonial Africa's preference of colonial languages as offi cial language could be considered as regression to the Middle Ages period of Europe where offi cial language was confi ned to the nobility (a high culture -to use Ernest Gellner's terminology), whereas the general population was speaking various mother tongues (low culture). Hence, instead of bringing together the elite and the masses into a common language, the result has become the prevalence of two sections living worlds apart thereby making the nation state building enterprise precarious and permeated with all sorts of pathologies. Th e permeability of the nation state building process with all sorts of pathologies has necessarily disposed not only the precariousness of the nation state in Africa but also the divergence of discourse surrounding it.
Offi cial language in its socio-political role, and a contributing factor in nation building is meant to fulfi l a vital national role -national integration. Integration as a functional social mechanism in a poly-ethnic setting may take two indispensable forms -horizontal and vertical. While vertical integration involves the integration of the lower and upper strata of an ethnic community, horizontal integration refers to social cohesion across ethnic communities. Further vertical integration also facilitates social communication between the rulers and the ruled (Mazrui and Mazrui 1998: 184) that as was pointed out seem to live worlds apart. In terms of horizontal integration, in the African context where the characterizing feature is poly-ethnicity, integration becomes an indispensable endeavour whose successfulness determines the destiny of the African State. In this integrative function, offi cial language is presumed to play a pivotal role, among other things, through standardized dissemination of information across the nation (cf. Anderson 1991 , Hobsbawm 1990 .
To turn to the case at hand, the EPLF and later the Eritrean Government, described their education and language policy as intended to promote national unity and development (cf. National Charter 1994, Constitution 1997). As any emerging state, the Eritrean state agents' hope and their ambition, as demonstrated in the various documents (National Charter, Macro-policy, Constitution), therefore, is to be able to build an integrated and unifi ed nation state. National unity and nation state building is one of the declared cardinal objectives of the Eritrea state actors (cf. Macro-policy 1994 , National Charter 1994 , Ministry of Information 2002 . Nevertheless, the language policy of the GoE goes, implicitly and explicitly, against the tradition of agents of state building where they struggled to achieve a unifying homogenous offi cial language. Indeed, in the fi rst glimpse the policy of language could be seen as a departure from the dominant trend. Th ough, in reality the development seems to be inclining to single language domination. Overall, the current debate in Eritrea, far from leading to a standardized and centralized offi cial language, believed to be a prerequisite for building cohesive nation state, is geared toward multilinguisticity.
As we could deduce from the analysis above, neither the bilingual offi cial language nor the non-offi cial language -equality of languages -views in Eritrea, derives from the orthodox monolingual offi cial language principle. Th erefore, the implication of both views for the process of nation state building is not clear-cut. Th eoretically, both fall short of the commonly understood role and position of the historically unifying and centralizing offi cial language. Empirically, except that it may satisfy those who advocate language rights, it fails to provide concrete mechanisms of how to resolve the problematic that relate multilinguality and nation state building.
Th e all languages equal, non-offi cial language policy pursued by GoE, contrary to its ambition of building a cohesive, potent and functional unitary nation state, falls short of providing a language policy that would ensure the proclaimed aim. If fully developed it could lead to the emergence of nine language-based nations. Hence, the all languages equal policy, seen from the perspective of the traditional unifying and integrating offi cial language position, is questioned whether it would contribute to the process of nation state building. Neither is the bilingual offi cial language strategy deemed to be friction free, in the way its proponents perceive it. It is likely that it could lead to the development of two nations. Th ese two nations could be based on the two socio-cultural identity formation, notably Tigrinya-Christian and ArabicIslamic. Experiences of Canada (Quebec) and Belgium are highly illustrative here. Canada seems to increasingly grow into two ethno-linguistic nationsEnglish speaking and French speaking. Th e problem is more critical in Belgium where the emergence of Flemish speaking and French speaking ethnonations seems to be inevitable (cf. Kymlicka 1995 Kymlicka , 2006 .
From technical, pragmatic and economic point of view, the bilingual official language policy seems to be more practical compared to a nine language policy. Th e most unenviable scenario with regard to nation state building, however, would be adopting a monolingual offi cial language. It is important to note that those opposing the language policy of the GoE charge that it is an intentionally orchestrated strategy of Tigrinya political elite to promote the dominant position of Tigrinya (cf. EISM 1998 , AbeArre 2001 , Negash 1999 . Th is charge indicates the politicization of language because it is based on the assumption that the GoE is dominated by the Tigrinya speakers; it never attempts to consider whatever merits the policy might bear. If the charge is correct it may be politically dangerous but instrumentally functional.
One of the problems nation state building and social integration suff ers is the marked absence of clear policies, strategies, perspectives, defi nitions and concepts of language and language policies that are applicable to particular realities and contexts. Th e implication of this ambiguity of concepts, principles, policies and strategies in the endeavour of nation state building, for the newly born nation state of Eritrea, is thus not unequivocally clear thus the nation state building enterprise and social integration visibly encounters considerable diffi culties. Th e most impeding factor however is the disunity of elites along ethnicity and religion. As long as elites are divided along the Arabic-Islam and Tigrinya-Christian, the nation state building process and social integration in Eritrea will face veritable obstacles.
Concluding Remarks
I set out in this paper to analyze the politics of language in Eritrea. Th e analysis identifi ed a number of empirical dimensions around which the focus is centred. Th ese are: (i) correlation between mother tongue and ethnicity, (ii) the right to be instructed in one's own mother tongue, (iii) offi cial language vs. mother tongue, (iv) the imperatives of bilingual offi cial langue, (v) offi cial language and nation state building. All this was preceded by brief theoretical and historical overviews.
Th e section on ethnic and mother tongue discussed the relation between mother tongue and ethnic identity formation. Th e paper has demonstrated that the correlation between mother tongue and ethnic identity formation is inconclusive; sometimes it could be necessary but not suffi cient, while at another time it could be necessary and suffi cient, while yet, at other times, could neither be necessary nor suffi cient for the emergence of ethnic identity. It also became clear that the politicization of language sets the relation of mother tongue and ethnic identity, particularly when it comes to instruction in mother tongue, on an antagonistic footing. Th is antagonistic standing has thus infected instruction in mother tongue while some argue for the right of instruction in mother tongue others oppose mother tongue instruction on the basis that it will undermine the position of Arabic in Eritrea.
Th e paper also briefl y analyzed the evolution and role of offi cial language in Eritrea. In that connection an attempt was made to shed light on the controversy surrounding the relation between offi cial language and mother tongue in polyglotic Eritrea. Th e paper argued that the primary cause of the controversy has to do, partly, with the elites' inability to separate between offi cial language as the formal and offi cial (national public sphere), and mother tongue as inoffi cial, sub-national and local. Th e controversy, partly, has also to do with power relation among elites. It is argued that the ambiguous relation between mother tongue and ethnic identity is then arguably dictated by the two factors. Th e paper also highlighted the argument that accentuates that to be instructed in one's own mother tongue, in addition to facilitating the child's development is also fundamental democratic rights of communities as well as individuals. After discussing the benefi ts and downsides of adopting offi cial language, the paper addressed the imperatives of having bilingual offi cial language in Eritrea. Moreover, the function and signifi cance of offi cial language for the enterprise of nation state building in a historical context and for the post-liberation state of Eritrea is also highlighted. From the perspective of social cohesion and integration, it is argued that offi cial language that stretches across ethnic boundaries (lingua franca) could play a decisive role in the process of building a potent and functional nation state in Eritrea.
Th e paper has demonstrated that the language issue in Eritrea is so divisive because it involves power relations. After all as Bourdieu suggests language is not only a medium of communication, but also a source of political, economic and cultural power. Further Bourdieu (1991: 66) notes, "utterance are not . . . signs to be understood and deciphered, they are also signs of wealth, intended to be evaluated and appreciated, and signs of authority, intended to be believed and obeyed". In this sense, language as an embodiment of variety of capitals constitutes an epicentre for elite rivalry and competition. Th e act of competition is performed in what Bourdieu calls linguistic market, where not merely the production and reproduction of linguistic capital takes place, but also its maintenance and possession. Linguistic competence endows one with all capitals: economic, political, social, cultural and symbolic. Th erefore, the emergence of the market in two occasions in Eritrea was presented in the paper. Deriving from Bourdieu's conceptualization of the politics of language, it would be possible to infer that power relations stand behind the language controversy in Eritrea, i.e., both implicit and explicit power relations. Power is understood here in its broad sense. Th e main reason for those elites from Moslem communities that perceive the relation between offi cial language and mother tongue as based on zero-sum, believe that promoting mother tongue would undermine the position of Arabic thereby disproportionally benefi ting Tigrinya elites. Th e assumption derives from the understanding that mother tongues depreciate the value of Arabic by dispersing its component elements. Suppressing mother tongue (the imagined components of the entity that is to embody Arabic) and engendering social equilibrium through bilingual offi cial language that produces binary socio-cultural identity would maximize and restore the potential value of Arabic, is the argument of its proponents, which of course is intended to maximize their competitive capacity against the Tigrinyan elites. For the Tigrinyans, the propitious position against the eff orts of linguistic equilibrium creation, likewise other mother tongues, is to oppose it. Th e reason for this is, from pure linguistic perspective, because it depreciates the value of Tigrinya either by subjecting it to domination or undermining its demographic hegemonic position. Moreover, from a socio-political perspective also, it has the potentiality of dividing society along religiolinguistic lines. Th e bilingual offi cial language strategy intended to be promoted at the expense of mother tongue is then presumed to strengthen the competitive capacity of Arabic. Vesting hegemonic status on Arabic vis-à-vis mother tongue would maximize its competitive capital while at the same time denying mother tongues competitive edge.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that it is not only elites who prefer Arabic to their own vernacular language (mother tongue), but also some of the ethno-linguistic groups too. Th e groups' language preference is primarily driven by instrumentalist point of view. Th at gaining competence in Arabic or Tigrinya will increase their children's potential to fi nd employment in the public sphere where Arabic and Tigrinya remain the dominant languages.
Th e strong opposition to mother tongue in Eritrea draws its inspiration from the assumption that the usage and development of mother tongue in the private as well as public sphere is not only inhibiting Arabic from assuming offi cial status but also allowing Tigrinya to dominate. Tigrinya domination, it is argued, is not merely cultural domination but political domination as well that bestows an unchallenged competitive edge to the Tigrinya speaking elite. Th is perception derives from the asymmetrical power relation existing between the various ethnolinguistic groups as well as a constructivist perception of social power. Th e asymmetrical power relation is engendered by demographic asymmetry. According to proponents of this perception the remedy rests on the creation of a socio-cultural equilibrium. A socio-cultural equilibrium that is to be realized by juxtaposing the dominant Tigrinya ethno-linguistic group against the rest that are to be metamorphosed in an Arabic-Islamic sociocultural supra-ethnic entity.
Finally, it is important here to stress that the inability to separate the question of offi cial language and mother tongue not only has been the greatest impediment to the development of mother tongue but also inhibited a constructive and fruitful discourse of language.
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